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Abstract—Security aspects in underwater wireless networks
have not been widely investigated so far, despite the critical
importance of the scenarios in which these networks can be
employed. For example, an attack to a military underwater
network for enemy targeting or identification can lead to serious
consequences. Similarly, environmental monitoring applications
such as tsunami prevention are also critical from a public safety
point of view. In this work, we assess a scenario in which a
malicious node tries to perform a jamming attack, degrading
the communication quality of battery-powered underwater nodes.
The legitimate transmitter may use packet level coding to increase
the chances of correctly delivering packets. Because of the
energy limitation of the nodes, the jammer’s objective is twofold:
disrupting the communication and reducing the lifetime of the
victim by making it send more redundancy. We model the jammer
and the transmitter as players in a multistage game, deriving
the optimal strategies. We evaluate the performance in a model-
based scenario and using real experimental data, performing a
sensitivity analysis to evaluate the performance of the strategies
if the real channel model is different from the one they use.
Index Terms—Underwater acoustic networks; jamming; game
theory; block code; security in underwater networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
UNDERWATER sensor networks are enabling severalmilitary, industrial, and environmental applications: the
ability to monitor the environment remotely is extremely
useful for oil and gas platform and pipeline maintenance,
seabed erosion and tsunami risk mitigation, and coastal patrol.
In this latter critical application, underwater sensor nodes can
identify and target enemies, extending the monitoring range
and allowing just a few patrol ships to cover a very wide
area [2].
However, underwater communications are hindered by the
high attenuation of electromagnetic waves. For this reason,
radio communications are only possible over very short-range
broadband links [3], and nodes at longer distances need to
use acoustic waves: depending on the frequency, acoustic
communication is possible at ranges from hundreds of meters
up to tens of kilometers [4]. However, even acoustic commu-
nications present some challenges, as sound waves have a low
propagation speed, causing long delays, and the environmental
noise caused by wind, marine life, and shipping activities
can be very strong. Furthermore, there are strong multi-path
effects due to the signal reflections with the bottom and the
surface [5], [6].
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energy-depleting jamming attacks.” [1]
In this already hostile environment, a Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attack can be very effective, disabling the victim node’s
communications and disrupting the monitoring operation. The
most effective way to perform it is by physical layer jamming:
the attacker transmits a high-power signal, causing interference
and blocking the correct reception of packets. There are
effective countermeasures that increase the robustness of the
transmission to jamming attacks, such as power control and
channel coding, but they come at a cost: the transmitter
node needs to spend more energy to protect its transmissions,
depleting its battery faster and reducing its lifetime.
In this work, we consider a jamming scenario in which the
attacker has a double objective: it tries to block the legitimate
communications, but it also turns the transmitter’s own defense
mechanism against it, forcing it to deplete its battery faster. We
model the scenario using game theory, considering both nodes
as rational players in a zero-sum multistage game, in which
each burst of packets represents a subgame. The jammer will
decide how long it will jam the channel, while the legitimate
transmitter’s move is the amount of redundancy that it will
add to each burst: both nodes are battery-limited, and they
both have a trade-off between increasing the probability of
success in the current subgame and saving their battery.
We can derive the optimal long-term strategies for both
players using a dynamic programming approach. For the sake
of analytical tractability, in this work we focus on the case
of full information available to both players, including the
outcomes of each transmission attempt and the battery state
of the nodes at any time. We study the trade-off between
energy consumption and transmission success probability as
a function of the distances between transmitter, receiver and
jammer.
Our game theoretic model and its Monte Carlo results were
presented in [1]. In the present work, we consider a more
realistic setting, presenting the results in a real-world scenario
from a lake experiment. Additionally, we derive recursive
analytical formulations of the lifetime and success probability,
using them to derive the results instead of Monte Carlo
simulations. We also analyze what happens when the nodes
do not have perfect information on the environment, and on
the channel in particular. We present the result of a sensitivity
analysis on the packet error probabilities, as well as on the
chosen channel model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
give an overview of the state of the art models of DoS jamming
attacks, focusing on the underwater scenario. In Sec. III, we
present the game theoretic model and the system scenario.
Sec. IV explains how to derive the optimal strategies for the
jammer and the transmitter. Sec. V defines the evaluation sce-
nario, Sec. VI describes the results and numerical evaluation,
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2and Sec. VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
One of the most common DoS attacks is physical layer
jamming [7]. The principle behind it is simple, yet powerful:
a malicious node injects signals into the channel in order
to deny or at least reduce service to the legitimate users
by increasing their noise level and preventing them from
receiving messages correctly. For instance, the attacker can
send single-tone jamming signals or white Gaussian noise
signals produced with the same bandwidth as the transmit-
ter [8]. The latter approach makes the attacker more flexible,
as the former is not effective if the transmitter uses spread-
spectrum techniques, such as frequency hopping or direct
sequence spread spectrum [9]. Other approaches, such as
adaptive jamming, require the attacker to have an adaptive
physical layer so as to change its modulation or transmission
power. The victims of a jamming attack may passively adopt a
simple duty cycling strategy [10], or actively react to the DoS
attack, e.g., by increasing their transmit power [11] or using
channel-hopping [12]. In case of active defense, game theory
is often used to model the interaction between the jammer
and its victim. The main drawback of active defenses is a
typically increased energy consumption, which means that the
defenses themselves can be exploited by the attacker to deplete
the victim node’s battery and interrupt its transmissions. In
this case, energy consumption needs to be included in the
game formulation by introducing power constraints [13], or
by considering nodes with limited energy. In the latter case,
the jamming attack is typically modeled as a zero-sum game
with a finite horizon [14], and optimal strategies are derived
by applying dynamic programming bottom-up, i.e., starting
from the lowest energy levels and exploiting the solution
to find the optimal strategy for higher energy levels. Our
previous work [15] applies this principle in an Internet of
Things (IoT) network, exploiting retransmissions as part of
the defense strategy. It also includes an analysis of the game
with incomplete information on the jammer’s capabilities.
Some recent works have also analyzed the jamming issue
in the context of underwater acoustic networks. For example,
[16] applies a reinforcement learning deep Q-network-based
transmission scheme as a countermeasure against a jamming
attack in a mobile underwater acoustic network. The jammer
sends acoustic signals with the same band as the transmitter,
and each agent can decide its own transmission power level.
The problem is modeled as a dynamic game in which all nodes
are power-constrained; the winner of the game is the last node
to completely deplete its battery. The results are proven via
both simulation and a pool test, in short range.
In underwater acoustic networks, the propagation delay can
be longer than the signal duration [17], especially in long
range scenarios. In this case, a malicious node that observes
the transmitter behavior and generates jamming signals as
soon as it detects a new transmission cannot jam the current
packet, since the jamming signal would reach the receiver
only after the complete reception of the transmitted packet.
Therefore, a jamming attack is effective in scenarios where the
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Fig. 1. An underwater jamming attack: a jammer J tries disrupting the
communication between a transmitter T and its intended receiver R.
jamming signal reaches the receiver before the payload packet
is completely received, such as when the jammer is placed
between transmitter and receiver, or when the transmitter sends
a sequence of packets with a deterministic or predictable
pattern, such as in data muling applications. In [18], the
authors propose a jamming defense strategy to provide secrecy
for block transmission in underwater acoustic networks. They
exploit the half-duplex nature of underwater transceivers and
the large propagation delays to create interference at the eaves-
dropper. Specifically, the receiver transmits jamming packets
to the malicious node during the guard time between data
blocks, keeping the jammer transducer in the reception state
and thereby preventing it from transmitting malicious signals.
These packets do not cause deafness at the transmitter, as the
propagation delay is larger than the guard time between blocks.
III. GAME THEORETIC MODEL
We consider a transmitter T at a distance dTR from a
receiver R, under attack from a jammer J , which is placed
at a distance dJR from R. The scenario is shown in Fig. 1:
T needs to periodically send an update to a receiver R, and a
malicious jammer J tries to block its transmission and deplete
its battery.
In order to protect its transmission from the attack and from
ambient noise, T uses packet-level coding: whenever it needs
to send an update to R, it also sends a number of redundancy
packets to protect the transmission from jamming attacks.
Assuming an efficient packet-level code, the K information
packets can be recovered if at least any K of the N coded
packets are correctly received [19].
The jamming attack is modeled as a zero-sum game G
between the two rational players T and J , i.e., a completely
adversarial and symmetric game in which each gain for one
player is balanced by a loss for the other [15], and we
study a full information scenario.1 The zero-sum model is
justified by the fact that the jammer aims at hindering the
transmitter’s goal as much as possible. The jamming game is
composed of a series of packet transmission subgames Gm,
with m ∈ N. In each subgame, node T uploads its data to
1Full information is justified by the fact that, at the end of each time frame,
R sends a feedback packet containing information on how many packets from
T it detected, how many slots were jammed by J , and how many packets
it received successfully. We assume that such feedback packets are perfectly
received by both J and T , as R is not power constrained.
3node R, in an attempt to report information on the surrounding
environment. Such data is chunked into K payload packets,
and T can exploit (i) Forward Error Correction (FEC) in
order to increase the probability of successful communication
over unreliable or noisy communication channels, and (ii)
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to detect residual error-
laden packets and discard them. In each subgame Gm, T
can decide the amount of redundancy to use, i.e., the number
N
(m)
T of packets to send over the channel. A maximum of
2K transmission opportunities is configured in each subgame,
thus K ≤ N (m)T ≤ 2K.
The outcome of each transmission attempt depends on the
choices made by T and J , and the conditions of the channel,
which is modeled stochastically. In particular, the transmission
succeeds if T is able to counteract the channel impairments
and the jamming attacks and deliver at least K packets to
the destination node within the duration of the subgame. We
assume a packet erasure channel, thus R can recover the K
information packets if any K of the N (m)T coded packets are
correctly received [19].
Both players are battery-powered nodes, and the dynamics
of the game are exhaustively characterized by their energy
evolution, i.e., the evolution of their battery charge during
the game. The battery levels take discrete values in the sets
Bi , [0, 1, . . . , B(0)i ], i ∈ {T, J}, with B(0)i ∈ N being the
initial charge of the battery. The battery levels in the sets
Bi are normalized by the energy Etx,i, i ∈ {T, J}, used to
transmit/jam each legitimate packet; we consider the quantum
Etx,i to be constant, since our active defense strategy does not
involve power control. Note that, as neither energy harvesting
nor other forms of energy replenishment are considered, the
battery levels can only decrease during the game. In each
subgame, node T decides the number of packets N (m)T to send
to complete the data transmission, and this corresponds to an
energy consumption of N (m)T quanta, since battery levels are
normalized. Note that, the larger N (m)T , the more robust the
communication, but the faster the depletion of T ’s battery and
the whole game duration. Similar energy considerations affect
the choice of the jammer, which has to decide the number of
transmission opportunities N (m)J to jam in order to disrupt T ’s
communication.
We now describe the structure of a single subgame and then
illustrate the evolution of the multistage full game. Table I
reports a summary of the notation used.
A. The Packet Transmission Subgame
Each subgame Gm models the attempt made by T to
transmit K information packets to R. The time after the
beginning of the first packet transmission is slotted into a
time frame of 2K time slots; each slot corresponds to the
time τ necessary to transmit a packet. Note that the long
propagation delays that characterize the underwater scenario
give an advantage to T : the first packet can never be jammed,
as the jammer does not have the time to sense the transmission
and send the jamming signal. However, since J knows the
duration of the time slot and the position of the transmitter
TABLE I
NOTATION AND MEANING OF SYSTEM PARAMETERS FOR GAME PLAYERS
i ∈ {T, J}.
Parameter Meaning
K Minimum number of packets to be delivered for success
τ Duration of a packet transmission
Γ Time horizon of multistage game G
λ Exponential discounting factor
αi Energy/PDR weighing factor
u
(m)
i Payoff function in subgame m
U
(m)
i Payoff function in multistage game G in subgame m
χ
(m)
i Indicator function of the success of subgame m
f
(m)
i Energy penalty function in subgame m
N
(m)
T Number of packets that T sends in subgame m
N
(m)
C Packets sent over clear channel in subgame m
N
(m)
B Packets sent over jammed channel in subgame m
N
(m)
J Number of packets that J tries to jam in subgame m
D(m) Total packets delivered in subgame m
d
(m)
C Packets delivered over clear channel in subgame m
peC Packet error probability over clear channel
peB Packet error probability over jammed channel
B
(m)
i Battery level in subgame m
Etx Energy required to transmit/jam a packet
Ptx Transmission power
and receiver, we assume that it can trigger its transmissions to
perfectly jam the subsequent time slots.
Thus, T decides (i) how many packets N (m)T ∈ N (m)T ,
{K,K+ 1, . . . ,min(2K,B(m)T )} to send to R, and (ii) which
time slots to employ for the transmission among the 2K
available. Similarly, J chooses (i) the number of packets
N
(m)
J ∈ N (m)J , {0, 1, . . . ,min(2K − 1, B(m)J )} to jam,
and (ii) the N (m)J jammed time slots out of 2K − 1 (as
the first packet cannot be jammed). Note that the actions
of both players are limited by the current battery level at
stage m, i.e., B(m)i , i ∈ {T, J}. T and J make independent
decisions on N (m)T and N
(m)
J , respectively. Such decisions are
made in advance for the whole time frame, right before the
transmission of the first packet.
The payoffs of the players are convex combinations of
monotonic functions of the energy required to transmit/jam
the packets and of the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR). By
tuning the weight α ∈ [0, 1], the main objective of the
players can be shifted between saving energy, thereby reducing
N
(m)
T and N
(m)
J , and delivering more packets. Based on these
considerations, we express the players’ payoffs for a single
subgame m as:
u
(m)
T = α f
(m)
T + (1− α)χ(m)T (1)
u
(m)
J = −u(m)T . (2)
The first term of Eq. (1) is related to energy, while the
second term concerns the outcome of the communication.
In particular, the indicator term χ(m)T is equal to one if the
subgame m ends with T successfully delivering at least K
packets to R, and zero otherwise.
Function f (m)T gives T a penalty for consuming energy
when transmitting packets. In particular, we set:
f
(m)
T = −
N
(m)
T
(2K + 1)
. (3)
4The additional term 1 in the denominator of (3) is arbitrary
and ensures that the absolute value of f (m)T is always smaller
than 1, thus preventing any strategy to be dominated by not
transmitting at all. Moreover, notice that the number of packets
N
(m)
J jammed by node J is not explicitly present in the
payoffs for the single subgame, since we assumed a zero-
sum game. Nevertheless, N (m)J still plays a major role in
the complete game: the larger N (m)T , the higher the energy
consumed by node J , and the faster its battery depletion.
Finally, the transmitter’s choice of the time slots in which to
transmit packets, and the jammer’s choice of which time slots
to jam, can be modeled as a simple anti-coordination game:
T ’s objective is to avoid the jammer and transmit as many of
its packets as possible on a clear channel, while J’s objective
is to correctly guess the slots that T will use and jam them,
so as to maximally disrupt the communication.
B. The Full Jamming Game
In a battery-limited scenario, the greedy strategy that max-
imizes the payoff for the next subgame is not always optimal.
The solution of the full jamming game G maximizes a long-
term payoff function within a given time horizon Γ, which
represents the number of future subgames to consider in the
payoff. The players’ payoffs in the multistage game G at stage
m are given by:
U
(m)
i (Γ) =
m+Γ−1∑
γ=m
λγ−mu(γ)i , i ∈ {T, J} (4)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a future exponential discounting factor [20],
u
(m)
i , i ∈ {T, J} is the subgame payoff defined in (1) and (2),
and Γ is the length of the payoff horizon, i.e., the number
of subgames that are considered. When Γ is finite, we can
consider λ = 1 with no convergence issues, while, for Γ =
+∞, we must consider λ < 1. Note that the payoff u(m)i for
a single subgame coincides with U (m)i (1).
IV. ANALYTICAL SOLUTION OF THE GAME
In this section, we explain how to derive the optimal
strategies for the two players in the case of perfect knowledge
about the opponent’s position and battery level at the beginning
of each subgame. We define as strategy si the action chosen
by player i ∈ {T, J}, i.e., the amount of energy required to
transmit or jam the legitimate packets, respectively. According
to the game defined in Sec. III, the strategy space is thus
N (m)i i ∈ {T, J} in each subgame. Note that the strategies
concern what to do in each subgame, but are chosen based on
the expected evolution over multiple subgames, as dictated by
Γ. We are interested in evaluating the Nash Equilibrium (NE),
i.e., the pair of optimal strategies (s∗T , s
∗
J) that are mutual
best responses [21]. In other words, a NE is reached when
neither player can improve its expected payoff by changing
its strategy unilaterally. Since the payoff functions of the
two players (see (4)) can include multiple subgames, the
NE of the jamming game can be calculated exactly with
dynamic programming. The NE may be pure, i.e., correspond
to deterministic strategies, or mixed, when strategy s(m)i for
player i ∈ {T, J} is a probability distribution Φsi (Ni) over
N (m)i . Under the assumption of full information, strategies
are determined by the state of the two players, assuming an
optimal strategy for lower battery states.
In the following, we first present the expressions for the
expected payoffs of nodes T and J that are needed to compute
the NE, and then describe the procedure to solve the game
analytically through dynamic programming.
A. Expected Payoff Calculation
To derive the NE, we need to characterize the expected pay-
off for a single subgame, denoted as E
[
U
(m)
i (1)
∣∣∣N (m)T , N (m)J ]
for the m-th stage of game G. Such expected payoff is equal
to the expectation of the payoffs u(m)i , i ∈ {T, J} given in
Eqs. (1) and (2). In the remainder of this section, we will omit
superscript (m) for the sake of a lighter notation.
The expected payoffs E
[
ui
∣∣∣NT , NJ], i ∈ {T, J} can be
calculated from the quantity E
[
χi
∣∣∣NT , NJ], i ∈ {T, J},
which represents the expected outcome of the subgame (as
introduced in Sec. III-A, χT and χJ are indicator terms for the
transmission and jamming success, respectively). We introduce
quantities NC ≤ NT and NB ≤ NT to indicate the number
of packets that node T sends over a clear and blocked (i.e.,
jammed) channel, respectively. Obviously, NT = NC + NB,
so we can easily obtain the value of NC once we know NB.
Using the law of total probability, for node T we have:
E
[
χT | NT , NJ
]
=
NT∑
NC=0
E
[
χT | NC
]
P
(
NB | NT , NJ
)
(5)
The first term inside the summation is the expectation of a
subgame success, given the number of packets successfully
delivered and jammed during that subgame. It can be expressed
as:
E
[
χT |NC
]
=
NT∑
D=K
D∑
dC=0
(
NC
dC
)
pNC−dCeC (1− peC)dC
·
(
NB
D − dC
)
pNB−(D−dC)eB (1− peB)D−dC
(6)
The external summation iterates on all possible values of the
number of delivered packets D ≤ NT resulting in a success.
Eq. (6) then splits D between packets that are delivered over
a clear channel, i.e., dC ≤ D, and those which are delivered
over a jammed channel, i.e., D − dC. For the two cases, the
packet error probability is equal to peC and peB , respectively,
and is a function of the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) or Signal
to Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR).
We consider a realistic modulation, such as Chirp Spread
Spectrum (CSS), which is used in several real underwater
acoustic modems. If a different modulation is used, the only
required change is in (7), while the rest of the model remains
the same. The packet error probability in the case of a jammed
signal, peB , can be computed as presented in [22], which
computes the Bit Error Rate (BER) considering Differential
Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (DQPSK) modulation in a
5radio frequency channel. We now adapt the definition of the
BER to the acoustic underwater scenario. The BER for a CSS
signal, pCSSbit , is computed as:
pCSSbit = Q(a, b)−
1
2
e−(a
2+b2)/2I0(ab) (7)
where Q is the Marcum Q function, I0 is the modified Bessel
function of order 0, and a and b are 2 parameters defined as:
a =
√
2Eb/N0
1 + J0/N0
(1−
√
0.5)
b =
√
2Eb/N0
1 + J0/N0
(1 +
√
0.5)
, (8)
where Eb is the received energy per bit of the transmitter,
N0 is the noise power spectral density, and J0 is the power
spectral density of the jammer, given by:
Eb =
τ
L
Ptx,T gT, J0 =
Ptx,J gJ
B
. (9)
The SINR is then given by SINR = EbL/τN0B+J0B , where L is
the packet length in bits, Ptx,i represents the transmit power
of node i ∈ {T, J}, B is the transmission bandwidth, and
gT and gJ model the gain of the underwater acoustic channel
between T and R and between J and R, respectively. Their
values depend on the distances dTR and dJR to the receiver,
respectively, as well as on the carrier frequency of the signal.
Both noise and channel gain can be computed as described
in [4, Sec. II].
Finally, the packet error probability peB is given by:
peB = 1−
(
1− pCSSbit
)L
, (10)
We also consider the packet error probability if a Reed-
Solomon (RS) channel code is employed [23]. We analyzed the
performance with an RS(127,78) with q = 7 bits per symbol
and an error correction capability of t = 24 symbols. In this
scenario, the packet is lost if more than t symbols are not
received correctly:
peB =
N∑
i=t+1
(
N
i
)
pis(1− ps)(N−i) (11)
where ps = 1−
(
1− pCSSbit
)q
is the symbol error probability.
Finally, the second term in Eq. (5) can be expressed as:
P
(
NB | NT , NJ
)
=
(
NT−1
NB
)(
(2K−1)−(NT−1)
NJ−NB
)(
2K−1
NJ
) , (12)
where we have imposed the condition that the first transmitted
packet cannot be jammed due to the signal propagation charac-
teristics of the underwater scenario, as described in Sec. III. In
Eq. (12) , we assume that both the transmitter and the jammer
choose the slots to transmit (or jam) according to a uniform
distribution among all possible NT -tuples (or NJ -tuples) of
slots. This is the choice that maximizes (for the transmitter)
or minimizes (for the jammer) the probability that at least K
slots in the transmission are free from collision. This strategy
pair is the NE for the anti-coordination slot selection game
we mentioned in Sec. III-A: since all slots after the first have
the same success probability, the optimal strategy for both
players is to randomly choose NT − 1 and NJ among them.
Any other strategy would be strictly dominated, since it would
provide the opponent with a pattern to exploit: if T chooses a
slot with high probability, J will try to mirror it and jam the
communication more effectively. The only exception to this
is the first slot, which the jammer cannot jam; it is trivial to
show that a strategy that includes it with probability 1 and
selects the others with uniform probability strictly dominates
any others for the transmitter.
Substituting (6) and (12) into (5), we can finally obtain the
expected value of the indicator function χ(m)i and then the
expected value of the payoffs u(m)i .
B. Dynamic Programming Solution
In the case of full information, an optimal solution of the
multistage game can be determined through dynamic program-
ming. We define the system state as S(m) ,
(
B
(m)
T , B
(m)
J
)
,
where B(m)i is limited by the initial battery level B
(0)
i of player
i ∈ {T, J}. If Γ > 1, the payoff in state S(m) takes the payoff
of the future Γ − 1 subgames into account. The game ends
when the transmitter’s battery is not sufficient to transmit at
least K packets, i.e., when B(m)T < K. We denote this final
state as ε and define its payoff as:
U
(m)
i
(
Γ | S(m) = ε
)
= 0 ∀ i,Γ . (13)
We can now define U (m)i
(
Γ | S(m)) recursively for all other
states, considering that the battery charge can never increase,
hence B(m+1)i ≤ B(m)i ∀i,m. It is:
U
(m)
i
(
Γ | S(m)
)
= E
[
u
(m)
i | S(m)
]
+ λ
∑
S
U
(m+1)
i (Γ− 1 | S) P
(
S(m+1) = S | S(m)
)
,
(14)
The payoff in a state is thus computed as the expected payoff
u
(m)
i obtained in the subgame corresponding to that state plus
the payoff that is expected to be obtained in the next subgame,
discounted by factor λ (see (4)). This latter term is calculated
by averaging over all possible next states S(m+1) weighed by
the probability of transitioning to that state. For a given pair
of strategies (sC , sJ), such state transition probability is given
by:
P
(
S(m+1) =(BT , BJ) | S(m)
)
= ΦsT
(
B
(m)
T −B(m+1)T
)
· ΦsJ
(
B
(m)
J −B(m+1)J
)
. (15)
By substituting (15) into (14), we have a full recursive
formulation for the payoff U (m)i (Γ) for any strategy pair. Once
the payoff bimatrix is thus constructed, the Lemke-Howson
algorithm can be used to find the mixed NE [24]. By starting
from the lowest states and calculating the expected payoffs
U
(m)
i (γ), γ ∈{1,. . . ,Γ}, the game can be solved completely.
Fig. 2 shows the state transition graph for the multistage game
G. Transitions are allowed from bottom to top and from right
to left, as a consequence of nodes T or J consuming energy
6ε
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Fig. 2. State transitions for the multistage game G.
to send or jam packets, respectively. The game ends at stage
h ∈ N when state ε is reached, i.e., when B(h)T < K. Notice
that, if the battery of J empties before T ’s, the game evolves
in the limit condition of T playing against the channel.
After computing the strategies, we can evaluate the expected
lifetime E
[
L|S(m)] of the transmitter node, defined as the
number of blocks that it can transmit (either successfully or
not), i.e., the number of subgames that will be played before its
battery is depleted. Using (15), we define the expected lifetime
for state S(m) recursively:
E
[
L|S(m)
]
=
B
(m)
J∑
BJ=0
B
(m)
T −K∑
BT=0
(
1 + E
[
L|S(m+1)
])
P
(
S(m+1) =(BT , BJ) | S(m)
)
. (16)
The lifetime takes into account the subgame (m), which
is summed to the lifetime of each possible state S(m+1),
weighted by its probability. Since the game ends in state ε,
we can now define the base step of the recursive formulation:
E
[
L|S(m) = ε
]
= 0. (17)
We can also derive the expected success probability
PS
(
S(m)
)
using the same reasoning. The success probability
for the current subgame is averaged with the success proba-
bility in future states, weighted by the expected lifetime and
the probability of reaching those states using (16):
PS
(
S(m)
)
=
2K∑
NT=K
2K−1∑
NJ=0
P
(
S(m+1) = S
(m+1)
NT ,NJ
| S(m)
)
·
E [χT |NT , NJ ] + E
[
L|
(
S
(m+1)
NT ,NJ
)]
PS
(
S(m+1)
)
1 + E
[
L|S(m+1)NT ,NJ
] , (18)
where S(m+1)NT ,NJ =
(
B
(m)
T −NT , B(m)J −NJ
)
. The base step
is the same as for the lifetime:
PS (ε) = 0. (19)
V. SCENARIO SETTIGNS
We evaluate the performance of the optimal strategies by
studying the energy consumption and the PDR of T in two
scenarios, a model-based one and an experimental one. We
set up the two scenarios using the same transmitter and
scenario parameters, trying to make them as comparable as
possible: for this reason, the relative positions of the three
nodes (transmitter, jammer, and receiver) are the same in both
scenarios. For this scenario, we considered a carrier frequency
equal to 26 kHz and a bandwidth of 16 kHz, like in the
lake experiment. The power setting was the same for both
transmitter and jammer, specifically they use a transmission
power Ptx,i = 180 dB re 1µPa, with i ∈ {T, J}. However, the
two scenarios used different packet error probabilities, derived
from a theoretical model and a lake experiment, respectively.
A. Model-based scenario
In this scenario, jammer and transmitter are trained and
evaluated using the uncoded CSS modulation with DQPSK;
the packet error probability is given in (10). As mentioned
above, the considered propagation model is described in [4],
where only the Line of Sight (LoS) component is considered.
The wind speed, shipping factor and geometrical spreading
factor are set to 3 m/s, 1 and 1.75, respectively. We remark
that the settings are different from our previous work: we used
a different modulation, which leads to a different packet error
probability formula. However, the game theoretic model works
independently of these settings. The channel settings (with few
reflections and a strong line of sight component) are optimistic,
as real scenarios in shallow water often have strong reflections
and environmental noise. The parameters of the model are
summarized in Table II.
B. Experimental settings
The lake experiment took place in the Garda lake on
Thursday 17th October 2019, just off the Bardolino town
coastline. The weather was sunny, and the maximum wind
speed we experienced during the experiment was 8 m/s. Most
of the waves were caused by the motion of the surrounding
ships: shipping activity was very heavy, as our network was
deployed at only 500 m from the Bardolino ferry station, and
the receiver node was placed close to a boat rental service.
All the measurements have been performed from 10 AM to
4 PM. The experimental setup was composed of 3 nodes
equipped with EvoLogics S2C R 18/34 WiSE modems [25]:
the receiver was deployed from a floating pier (N 45.549108, E
10.715181), the transmitter from a working boat anchored 80
meters west of the receiver (N 45.549165, E 10.714172), and
the jammer from a working boat placed at different locations,
between 20 and 180 meters west of the receiver. The map of
the node positions is shown in Fig. 3, and Fig. 4 is a photo
of the scenario from the receiver’s perspective. The water
depth was 4 m at the receiver, 10 m at the transmitter, and
varying from 4 to 15 meters at the jammer, depending on its
location. All the nodes were deployed at a depth of 2 m, and
both J and T were sending signals with an acoustic power of
180 dB re 1µPa.2 Both the modems deployed from the Tx and
the Rx stations used the standard EvoLogics firmware, while
node J was transmitting continuous signals at 1 kbps by using
the low-level EvoLogics firmware, described in [26]. Every 2
2A higher acoustic transmission power is available, up to 186 dB re 1µPa.
7Fig. 3. Node deployment in the Garda lake. The figure reports all the positions (red diamond) in which the jammer node was placed during the experiment.
Transmitter position (green diamond) and receiver position (blue diamond) are reported as well.
Fig. 4. Picture of the experiment taken from the receiver node station when
the jammer was in position J5 (Figure 3).
TABLE II
PARAMETERS SETTING.
Parameter Value
Modem carrier freq 26 kHz
Modem bandwidth 16 kHz
Modem bitrate 1 kbps
Payload length 64 Bytes
T and J Ptx 180 dB re 1µPa
peC (lake exp) 0.04
peC (models) 0
Spreading factor k 1.75
Shipping factor s 1
Wind speed w 3 m/s
seconds, T sent one instant message packet with a payload
length of 64 Bytes at the same bitrate of J. Together with the
EvoLogics header and coding used by the standard EvoLogics,
the packet duration was approximately 0.86 s (value provided
by the modem at the moment of the reception). In order to
avoid that T’s transmissions are blocked by the reception of
J’s signals (as the acoustic modems are, for their nature, half-
duplex devices), T was set in deaf mode, i.e., its receiver unit
was disabled. Both T and J used a Quadrature Phase Shift
Keying (QPSK) modulation, with each symbol spread to the
whole bandwidth (using the so-called sweep-spread carrier
(S2C) technology).
VI. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section we report and assess the results for both
the synthetic and the lake experiment scenarios described in
Section V.
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Fig. 5. Blocked channel packet error rate peB for a jammed slot as a function
of the distance dJR between J and R when the distance between T and R is
dTR = 78 m, using the uncoded model.
A. Model-based scenario results
Based on the position of the jammer, we can distinguish
three regions in the underwater area, as shown in Fig. 5. When
the jammer is close to the receiver, any jammed packet is
almost surely lost, as the received jamming signal is powerful
enough to cause errors in the transmission. In our system
scenario, this situation happens when the receiver-jammer
distance is less than 40 m. Conversely, when the jammer is far
from the receiver, its attack is completely ineffective, as the
legitimate signal is much stronger; in our case, this happens
when J is farther than 80 m from R. Between these two
extremes, an appropriate strategy might significantly improve
the performance: it is interesting to investigate how the game
evolves in the critical region (where dJR ∈ [40, 80] m in our
scenario), and which distances yield a successful game for T .
This partition is also clear from Fig. 6, which shows the
transmission success probability of a subgame as a function
of the distance between J and R. The success probability
is close to 1 when the jammer is far away, and quickly
drops when it gets closer than 80 m. It is interesting to
note that the success probability when the jamming node
is close decreases for longer time horizons; in this case, T
tries to save energy while still transmitting, and a shorter
window leads to a more aggressive policy. However, agents
with a longer time horizon can avoid suboptimal choices.
The jammer is particularly affected by this short-sightedness,
as its reward function does not explicitly have a penalty for
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Fig. 6. Success probability in a single subgame as a function of dJR using
the uncoded model, for different values of Γ when α = 0.4.
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Fig. 7. Transmitter’s lifetime as a function of dJR using the uncoded model,
for different values of the time horizon Γ when α = 0.4.
energy expenditure, and it will waste energy if its horizon is
too short, quickly exhausting its own battery. This causes a
temporary drop in the success probability, which is quickly
reversed when the jammer depletes its battery and tries to
fight a lost battle against the transmitter. In fact, a short time
horizon corresponds to both a higher success probability and
a higher lifetime for the transmitter, as shown in Fig. 7. Since
the initial jammer battery B(1)J is set to 200 packets, Γ = 30
is the only value that ensures that the jammer will not act
in a myopic way. We remind the reader that in this case,
simply switching to a short-term strategy will not benefit the
legitimate transmitter: since the long-term result is the NE,
choosing any other strategy will decrease its expected payoff
even further. It is interesting to note that the infinite horizon
jammer also suffers from this issue, since its temporal discount
λ = 0.9 is small enough to make it weigh present rewards
more than heavy future losses. For the rest of this analysis,
we will consider the scenario in which Γ = 30.
The aggressiveness of a long-sighted jammer seems to have
little effect on the results: as Fig. 8 shows, lower values
of the parameter α correspond to a slightly higher success
probability, but the curves are very close. A jammer close to
the receiver can reduce the transmission success probability
to less than 10%, but the aggressiveness parameter only has
a significant impact on the success probability in the critical
region. Since K = 4 and BT,0 = 200, the maximum lifetime
of T is 50 subgames, and is reached when T does not add any
FEC. The minimum lifetime is 25 subgames, in the case in
which T always sends 2K packets, providing the maximum
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Fig. 8. Success probability in a single subgame as a function of dJR using
the uncoded model, for different values of α when Γ = 30.
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Fig. 9. Transmitter’s lifetime as a function of dJR using the uncoded model,
for different values of α when Γ = 30.
possible protection to its payload. Fig. 9 confirms that there is
a downside to aggressiveness: more conservative nodes with a
higher α have a slightly longer lifetime in the critical region.
Naturally, the lifetime is maximized when dJR > 80 m, i.e.,
when the jammer no longer affects the packet reception. This
result holds for each value of α; in this situation, since almost
all packets are received correctly, the best strategy for the
transmitter is to send exactly K packets, in order to minimize
the energy consumption. Naturally, the critical area definition
depends on the transmission power and modulation, and its
boundaries can be different in other scenarios.
We also note that the lifetime decreases when the jammer is
in the critical region, where strategies have a significant impact
on the outcome of the game, and transmitters have to behave
more aggressively to maximize their payoff. Accordingly, the
decrease is far less pronounced for higher values of α and
longer time horizons.
We also perform a sensitivity analysis by running a Monte
Carlo simulation of the synthetic scenario, changing the error
probabilities peC and peB randomly at each episode. We set
a threshold for the blocked channel error probability, so that
it is never lower than the clear channel error probability, and
add two independent Gaussian components with zero mean
and standard deviation σ to each component. In this case, the
choices of the two players become suboptimal, since they are
operating with an incorrect model of the environment. Node
lifetime is not affected, since the nodes make the same choices,
but the success probability is, as Fig. 10 shows. The effect
is interesting, and most noticeable outside the critical region:
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Fig. 10. Success probabilities for different values of the error standard
deviation σ as a function of dJR using the uncoded model, for α = 0.4
and Γ = 30.
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Fig. 11. Blocked channel packet error rate peB for different channel models
as a function of dJR, for α = 0.4 and Γ = 30.
when the jammer is very close to the receiver, the success
probability slightly improves as σ grows, while the opposite
happens (with much larger effects) when the jammer is far.
This might be due to the threshold effect, as the packet error
probability cannot be lower than 0 or higher than 1: in this
case, the errors are biased. In the critical region, the model
error has a slightly negative effect on the success probability,
favoring the jammer.
B. Experimental scenario results
In the lake experiment scenario, we consider the packet error
rate measured empirically, shown in Fig. 11, to run the analysis
of the success probability and lifetime. The three models, using
coded and uncoded transmission with theoretical LoS channel
and the lake experiment results, are very different, but all three
have a sigmoid-like shape. We consider a scenario in which
both the transmitter and the jammer node are trained on one
of the theoretical models, since it would be impractical to
perform sea trials in every scenario before deployment. As
Fig. 11 shows, the uncoded packet error rate curve is similar
to the measured curve for dJR ≤ 60 m, while the coded packet
error curve is completely different, as the jammer is already
supposed to be completely ineffective at a distance dJR ' 40
m. The channel model we used in the theoretical analysis was
extremely optimistic, with a strong LoS component and a very
low ambient noise. The real propagation environment is much
tougher, so the packet error probability is generally higher even
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Fig. 12. Success probability for different strategies as a function of dJR in
the sea trial scenario, for α = 0.4 and Γ = 30.
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Fig. 13. Transmitter’s lifetime for different strategies as a function of dJR
in the sea trial scenario, for α = 0.4 and Γ = 30.
though the communication system used channel coding, espe-
cially in a shallow water scenario akin to the one experienced
during the lake experiment. We also consider a dummy jammer
which always jams K + 1 slots (theoretically blocking any
transmission), allowing the transmitter (which has the correct
packet error probability model) to react optimally to its basic
strategy. This case is used as a baseline, since it is the most
favorable for the transmitter.
Fig. 12 shows how using a very optimistic model of the
packet error probability leads to an unbalanced scenario: the
jammer, convinced that its actions will have little or no effect,
saves energy by just not transmitting anything. The transmitter
then has a free channel and just has to contend with the
ambient noise, which is, however, a bit higher than it expects.
The players using the uncoded model, which is far closer
to the real packet error probability curve, reach a similar
equilibrium. Finally, the dummy jammer strategy is actually
close to optimal at long distances, while it allows far more
data to get through when the jammer is close.
In general, the transmitter almost always chooses a con-
servative strategy, as Fig. 13 shows. Since the correct packet
error probabilities are higher than the ones predicted by the
models, and particularly the coded one, the lifetime of the
node with the correct model decreases as it transmits slightly
more redundancy. This is also true for the dummy jammer
case, as its strategy of jamming K + 1 slots in each subgame
is quite aggressive.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we modeled and analyzed an underwater jam-
ming attack aimed at disrupting the victim’s communication,
as well as depleting its battery. The legitimate transmitter can
leverage packet-level coding to protect its transmissions from
the jammer, at the cost of an additional energy expenditure.
We model the attack using game theory and derive the optimal
strategies in various scenarios, assuming that the jammer and
the legitimate transmitter are two rational players with full
knowledge about the adversary, playing a zero-sum game. The
simulation results highlight three regions where the jamming
attack is almost always successful, depends on the strategies
of the two players, or is ineffective, respectively. The critical
region in which the strategies can make a big difference is
the one in which the uncertainty over whether or not jammed
packets can be received is high.
In addition, we analyze what happens when the nodes
do not have complete information about the environment, or
consider short-term goals. Reducing the players’ horizon gives
an advantage to the transmitter, as the jammer will waste
energy in the early stages of the attack, but adding a random
error to the channel model advantages the jammer in the
ineffective region.
Finally, we consider a more realistic scenario, in which the
packet error probability is determined by the results of an
experiment performed in Lake Garda. We use this realistic
channel to analyze what happens when the whole model of
the channel is wrong: in one case, a jammer using the wrong
model performs worse than a simple dummy strategy that
always tries to jam the same number of packets.
Although the analytical solution is based on the simplifying
assumption of complete information available at the two
players, it still sheds light on the dynamics in this scenario. The
results of the model comparison analysis show that relaxing
the full information assumption, i.e., considering a Bayesian
incomplete information game, would significantly improve the
applicability of the model, making the nodes’ strategies more
robust to errors in the initial assumptions.
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